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SANCTIONING THE ENEMY. THE CASE OF LIVONIAN GRAIN DISPATCH TO MUSCOVY (1614). EDITION OF FRANTZ NYENSTEDE'S *ARTICULUM*

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Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine has boosted attention to the ways of punishing the aggressor and restraining its war machine. For a decade, the major tool of hindering the aggressor's military capacity has been imposing sanctions on critical products, technologies, persons, businesses. Hundreds of international corporations and companies alongside the state enterprises have joined the initiative of withdrawing from the Russian market. Although the current sanction policy is subject to constant criticism,¹ sanctions have been a subject of heated discussions for centuries. The present case study offers an insight into the Livonian struggle of sanctioning Muscovy as represented by 1614 Riga city councillor Frantz Nyenstede's (1540–1622) *articulum* for the upcoming Livonian Diet. Nyenstede warns about the consequences arising from unrestricted trade with critical staple food (grain) and gives examples of desirable actions.

1 Ukraine's closest allies in the Baltics, Nordics and Eastern Europe are critical of the attainability of international coalition's goal of collapsing Russia's economy owing to the lack of the political will among decision makers, 'business as usual' mentality, corrupt politicians etc. Russia, on the other hand, is downplaying the effects of sanctions in order to sow doubts among allies. The fact is, sanctions work: Borrell, Josep (2023). Yes, the sanctions against Russia are working, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/yes-sanctions-against-russia-are-working_en (seen: 12.10.2024).

Livonian (modern Latvia and Estonia) relationship with their eastern neighbours had seen good and bad days. Despite the occasional border skirmishes and frequent conflicts regarding trade,² in the medieval period their mutual relations were more about partnership than enmity.³ Negations and sanctions started to define their neighbour relations with the ascendancy of the Grand Duchy of Muscovy in the late-15th century.⁴ By the mid-16th century, the war-hardened enemy was no longer hiding its aggressive intentions in the region and forced demands which were not compatible with the sovereignty of Livonian principalities.

In 1548, ten years prior the outbreak of war in Livonia (1558–1583), which became a major theatre of war in the Baltic Sea region, the Livonians and their associates managed to disrupt the departure of 123 Western technicians and specialists to Muscovy recruited by merchant-diplomat Hans Schlitte. In his study of anti-Russian arms embargo Thomas Esper credits this and the subsequent 1550 Schlittes's affair as “the beginning of a blockade policy on the part of Ivan's [Ivan the Terrible; V. D.] neighbours”.⁵ This case illustrates the Livonian preoccupation with precluding Muscovy from acquiring superior Western technologies for the casting of guns, improving fortifications, etc. The list of sanctioned “war supplies” included metals and food – grain, salt, herring – for the provision of armies. The wealth of the Muscovite grand princes permitted them to buy as many guns, conscripts, craftsmen and munition as they needed. However, Livonia posed an obstacle to their military and man-power buildup. Most Western goods and technologies went in transit through the Livonian port towns of Riga, Reval (Tallinn), and Narva. In the early 16th century, Russian freedoms of free passage

2 Thomas Esper (1967). A Sixteenth-Century anti-Russian Arms Embargo. *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, Neue Folge, 15 (2), pp. 180–196; Jüri Kivimäe (1994). Late Medieval Narva between East and West: Trade and Politics. *KLEIO Estonian History Journal*, pp. 14–17.

3 Anti Selarts (2019). Krievijas karš pret “13. gadsimta NATO” jeb Livonijas vēsture 21. gadsimta sākļos. *Viduslaiku Livonija un tās vēsturiskais mantojums*. Sast. Andris Levāns, Ilgvars Misāns un Gustavs Strenga. Rīga: LNB, 128.–145. lpp., šeit 129. lpp.

4 Muscovite rise to the regional powerhouse was first marked with the capture of the Republics of Novgorod (1478) and Pskov (1510) and then, after the Tartar Khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan fell in their hands in 1551. Carl Eduard Napiersky (1849). Die Feldzüge der Russen in Livland und der Livländer in Rußland um das Jahr 1480. *Mitteilungen aus dem Gebiete der Geschichte Liv-, Est- und Kurlands*, 4, S. 88–147; Juhan Kreem (2022). *Ordu sügis. Saksa ordu 16. sajandi Liivimaal*. Tallinn: Tallinna Linnaarhiiv, lk. 31–34.

5 Esper 1967, 183.

and trade with foreigners had been restricted in Livonia to such an extent that they practically lost access to imported goods.⁶

Amidst all the Livonian efforts, the sanctioning was plagued by a number of difficulties. Livonians hinted at Western partners as the weakest link in the chain of imposing sanctions, and often brought sanctions against the Muscovites to the discussion tables of Western courts and diets.⁷ Cutting access to war supplies had to be weighed against potential losses from the lucrative eastern trade. Thus, nobody was willing to surrender their share of income, since sanctions touched on the underlying nerve of relations between the Baltic Sea countries, i.e., economic rivalry.⁸ Efforts to create a technological gap or sever Muscovy's supply channels were complicated by the different interpretations of "war supplies" and mutual distrust. Lastly, there would always be someone among Livonian or Western merchants / authorities willing to make a compromise, when mutually lucrative trade was at stake.⁹ Without formidable naval force at their command the Livonians could do little to enforce blockade and intercept law offenders.¹⁰ The military-political and economic leverage clearly was in favour of Livonian partners in the west and east.

The only product that was locally produced in large amounts, controlled by the domestic authorities and demanded in international markets, was grain. Livonia, along with Poland, was a breadbasket of international renown. Starting with the 15th century and particularly during the late 16th and early 17th centuries, Western countries increasingly relied on grain imports from the Baltic Sea region.

6 Norbert Angermann (2005). Zum Rußlandhandel von Dorpat-Tartu in der Zeit seiner höchsten Blüte (Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts). *Die baltischen Länder und der Norden. Festschrift für Helmut Piirimäe*. Hrsg. von Mati Laur, Enn Küng und Stig Örjan Ohlsson. Tartu: Akadeemiline Ajalooselts, S. 82–93, hier S. 83.

7 Of great importance was the Holy Roman Emperor's ruling of 3 April 1560 in the case of 16 Lübeck ships captured by Reval privateers. He maintained that no military assistance ought to be supplied to the Russians, neutral ships should be permitted to enter the enemy's harbours and Reval was to hand back the captured ships. Artur Attman (1979). *The Struggle for Baltic Markets. Powers in Conflict 1558–1618*. Göteborg: Vetenskaps- o. vitterhets-samhället (Acta Regiae Societatis Scientiarum et Litterarum Gothoburgensis, Humaniora 14), p. 43.

8 On the mutual distrust and discontent, see *ibidem*.

9 Esper 1967, 190–191.

10 Cappers or privateers did little to stop Western vessels from entering the enemy's waters that often commuted in convoys for safety reasons.

A less known fact is that Muscovy was supplied with the Baltic grain as well.¹¹ The source in question showcases poorly studied Livonian struggle of restricting Muscovy's access to this critical staple food.¹²

Nyenstede's *articulum*

Riga city councillor Frantz Nyenstede's *articulum*¹³ is a handwritten letter, 16 pages long. It is kept in the volume of "[Riga] City instructions to the Livonian Diets and Commissions, 1587–1614". In its form *articulum* emulate instruction, a certain kind of a decree that gave commands and advices of conduct to the envoys during diplomatic missions. Such documents were usually pertained to the legal situations, the economic and political realities, as well as interests of that or other participant of the negotiations. Nyenstede's *articulum* addressed the list of items to be discussed at the upcoming 1614 Livonian Diet in Wenden. In the absence of the 1614 council's instructions, it allows for partial reconstruction of the agenda of Wenden Diet, which consisted of 28 paragraphs. Nyenstede certainly disagreed with the way some issues had been treated in the instructions. The planned dispatch of grain to Muscovy (paragraph 5) was a major concern in Nyenstede's *articulum* as this topic covers 2 whole pages.

Frantz Nyenstede's expertise in merchandise with Muscovy was based on his personal experience. After settling in Dorpat in 1554, he carried out several

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- 11 Muscovite grain is rarely recorded in the 17th century fiscal accounts of Riga. Vasilij V. Dorosenko (1979). Riga und sein Hinterland im 17. Jahrhundert (Zum Problem der Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Stadt und Land). *Gewerbliche Produktion und Stadt-Land-Beziehungen*. Hrsg. von Konrad Fritze, Eckhard Müller-Mertens und Johannes Schildhauer. Weimar: Boehlau (Hansische Studien IV. Abhandlungen zur Handels- und Sozialgeschichte, 18), S. 155–172, hier S. 170. Muscovy was not a surplus producer of grain until the late 17th century, as evidenced by the soaring import numbers at Narva and Riga ports. Otto Liiv (1935). *Die wirtschaftliche Lage des estnischen Gebietes am Ausgang des XVII Jahrhunderts*. Tartu: Õpetatud Eesti Selts, S. 157.
- 12 Difficulties to halt grain export to Muscovy had been recorded prior the outbreak of Livonian war. Few such occasions are also reported in the fragment of the current study. Jüri Kivimäe (1998). Die Rolle von Dorpat (Tartu) im Hansisch-Russischen Handel im Spätmittelalter. *Steinbrücke. Estnische Historische Zeitschrift*, 1, S. 9–17, hier S. 15.
- 13 Latvijas Nacionālais arhīvs, Latvijas Valsts vēstures arhīvs, Rīga (LNA-LVVA), 673–1–1321, fol. 104r–112r. The authorship of the document is nowhere directly stated, but it can be established, based on the note at the end of the text: "In Neustets *articul[um]* *Sub exitum* A[nno] 1614 In Stadt geschrieffen".

trading missions in Russian cities of Novgorod, Moscow, and Pskov. “Russian trade” earned Nyenstede a good fortune and respectable burgher’s life in his future hometown of Riga. At the age of 43, Nyenstede was elected to the city council.¹⁴ During his long political career, Nyenstede demonstrated incredible leadership and a sense of righteousness in all matters related to the common good of citizenry. These qualities earned him much distinction, but no less enmity among the peers. By the time of writing his *articulum*, Nyenstede had reached the old age of 74 and perhaps his councillorship was no longer trusted. He wrote his *articulum* not in the capacity of a city councillor, but as a private citizen (*alß Priuatim*) and addressed it to Riga burgomaster (Hinrich von Ulenbrock?) alone. The motivation for writing the *articulum* was his concern about the adequacy of Rigan envoys to the upcoming Livonian Diet (and Polish–Lithuanian Sejm); they were burgomaster’s companions Nicolaus Ecke and Johann Friederichs. The former was “problematic”¹⁵ and the latter was torn between royal¹⁶ and private businesses. In short, they were not up to the task of representing the city’s interests in the “forthcoming decisive times”.¹⁷ Nyenstede trusted burgomaster as the ultimate resort in resolving the cases in Riga’s best interests.

The problem of grain export to the Muscovite enemy was put forth in the opening sentence of the 5th paragraph:

“So ist auch hie bei diesem Landtage, notwendigk Zu gedenken, wie izt ohne alleschew alles Korn auß dem Lande eigen Nuzes halben dem feinde Zugeführett, vnd das Landt an allen vorrath entblößett vnd in großerthewrung gesetzt werde welches *directé* wieder die Uhralte *recéssen* vnd *Vnion* der Landt Stände, auch den Städten Lande vnd Leütten zu eußersten schaden verderb gereichen thutt, das derwegen demselbigen möchte ein wandell gefunden werdenn.”¹⁸

Nyenstede urged the recipient to think over, how to fulfil the obligation of delivering all of the agreed amount of grain to the enemy without losing one’s face.¹⁹

14 Heinrich Julius Böthführ (1857). *Die Rigische Rathslinie vom Jahre 1226 bis auf die gegenwärtige Zeit*. Riga, S. 56–58; Frantz Nyenstedt (1839). *Livländische Chronik. Monumenta Livoniae Antiquae*. Bd. II. Riga und Leipzig, S. 5.

15 LNA-LVVA, 673–1–1321, fol. 104r.

16 J. Friederichs was the private factor and creditor of Polish king Sigismund III. Anna Ziemlewska (2008). *Ryga w Rzeczypospolitej Polsko-Litewskiej (1581–1621)*. Toruń: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu, s. 228, ref. 926.

17 LNA-LVVA, 673–1–1321, fol. 104r.

18 LNA-LVVA, 673–1–1321, fol. 105v.

19 Ibidem.

His major concerns were threefold: the deal would empty Livonia of all stocks, bring about the inflation of goods, the praxis run against the old time *recésen* and the *Vnion* of the Livonian Estates. Furthermore, carrying out the deal would inflict an all-encompassing damage to the Livonian cities, land and its people.

Nyenstede pronounced highly inflated allegations with non-existent factological base.²⁰ He did not mention either conditions or the organiser of the planned dispatch of grain. After all, as stated in the beginning of the *articulum*, he was only going through instruction points that had caught his attention “in passing” (*obiter*). Nyenstede’s claims that trade with the enemy would have damaging consequences were supported only by historic analogies from 1554.

Before interpreting Nyenstede’s claims and analogies, it is necessary to consider the historical background. The political situation in the region, in 1614, was not conventional. For more than a decade, the three regional powers – Sweden, Poland–Lithuania, and Muscovy had been at each other’s throats. In late 1600, Sweden launched military attacks in the Polish-controlled Livonian territories, thus beginning a series of two-decades-long campaigns only suspended by truce (1613, 1614) and the death of the Swedish king Charles IX (1611). Aside from Livonia, the interests of both rival powers crossed in the Russian war theatre. The dynastic crisis, which followed the death of the last ruler of the Rurik dynasty, Feodor I, in 1598, led to the Polish intervention and capture of Moscow in 1611, and lasted until 1613, when the dissolving realm was again united under the sceptre of new dynasty, the Romanovs. By 1614, the state of matters between these countries had reached an ambiguous standstill, though Poland officially was at war with Muscovy and Sweden, the former ally of Muscovy, had turned against it as well.

Livonia was not disconnected from warfare in the east. The early modern armies were poorly supplied with victuals and that translated in extensive plunder of surrounding territories, pronouncing blockades on enemies’ ports, closing in- and out-going roads for trade with ‘war supplies’. During the Polish war with Muscovy (1609–1618), the Poles banned the export of grain and war supplies to Muscovy.²¹ Livonian governor Jan Chodkiewicz (1566–1578) completely severed links with Muscovy.²²

20 There was no need to remind the recipient of the relevant facts, since both sides were aware of the issue in question.

21 Jarmo T. Kotilaine (1999). Riga’s trade with its Muscovite hinterland in the seventeenth century. *Journal of Baltic Studies*, 30 (2), pp. 129–161, here p. 133.

22 Ibidem, 132. In 1597–1598, in reaction to the hostile Swedish separatist movement, Polish–Lithuanian king Sigismund III declared embargo on the trade of grain and other victuals with Sweden. Numerous decrees were dispatched to Riga city in this matter. LNA-LVVA, 673–1–1221.

According to Nyenstede's *articulum*, it also included cutting connections with the closest trading centre in Muscovite hinterland, the city of Pskov.²³

Aside from country-wide sanction policy, the Livonian estates were trying to pursue their own principal position in sanctioning. Nyenstede's *articulum* is but a small puzzle in the mindset of the Livonian sanctioning policy.

As to the substance of his claims, the first one – that the trade with the enemy would empty the Livonian stocks of grain and cause inflation – is problematic for several reasons. To start with, Nyenstede does not provide any figures to support his point. Most importantly, Nyenstede forgets to mention the amounts of grain to be exported. In order to incur such devastating effects on the land, its people and cities, that usually were brought about only by war, plague or natural disasters, which in this case are nowhere mentioned in the contemporary accounts – the amounts had to be accountable not in absolute numbers but relative to the size of harvests and population to be fed. If we exclude the just mentioned *force majeure* situations, the only life-threatening condition to the local society would be the export of the seed that was necessary for the spring sowing.²⁴ The bad/good harvests and possible survival rates can be suggested only vaguely from the amounts of grain exported through Riga harbour. These figures were meticulously registered in the so-called grain registers (*Korn Register*) and kept by a specially appointed official.

Fig. 1. Total amount of exported grain from Riga harbour, in lasts²⁵

Year	Amount
1609	8820 lasts
1610	3743 lasts
1611	5131.5 lasts
1612	5404 lasts
1613	4448 lasts
1614	5926 lasts
1615	8299 lasts

23 In paragraph 6 Nyenstede urged the recipient to think about reinstating “free road” for merchandise from Pskov to Riga. Another issue was the “unusual” double taxation that should be lifted. At the same time, Nyenstede hints at the lawlessness in taxation, LNA-LVVA, 673–1–1321, fol. 106v.

24 By the end of winter/spring, peasant communities were usually on the brink of famine. The surplus harvest had been transported to Riga or kept in manors.

25 1609 – LNA-LVVA, 1389–1–7, fol. 89v; 1610 – LNA-LVVA, 1389–1–8, fol. 338r; 1611 – LNA-LVVA, 1389–1–8, fol. 148v; 1612 – LNA-LVVA, 1389–1–9, fol. 261v; 1613 – LNA-LVVA, 1389–1–10, fol. 306r; 1614 – LNA-LVVA, 1389–1–10, fol. 259v; 1615 – LNA-LVVA, 1389–1–12, fol. 100r. The weight of last is not known.

The 1614 grain exports roughly averaged the previous 5-year results. Despite the fluctuations – differences in marketing figures fell within the limits of approx. 50 percent – there were no significant crop failures (perhaps with the exception of 1610). Harvest, however, fell out of predictability range. The most obstructing factor was the ongoing war. Even under the conditions of truce, plunder of the land and necessity to provide for armies were not absent. The price promised by the foreign merchants was yet another (though, less) unpredictable factor to reckon with. Once the price seemed too low, the Rigans and landlords were more inclined to save grain for the next season or seed. All in all, these figures are in no way suggestive of the nearing inflation or shortages of provisions, and therefore Nyenstede's claims should be taken with a grain of salt.

The 1554 grain dispatches

In 1554, the elder (*Stadthalter*) of Pskov Bogdan Kowerin dispatched (a mission?) to the then bishop of Dorpat Herman II Wesel (1552–1558) informing him that the region of Pskov allegedly was ravaged by inflation (*theürung*).²⁶ Kowerin asked permission to import 200 *lasts* of grain for which he would pay in cash. The Livonians' response was positive, however, they would enter in the trade deal on a certain condition. The Russians would not be allowed to make purchases "to their liking in the land" (*nicht ihres gefallens binnen Landes*), but only in the city of Dorpat from its citizens. Conversely, should they face a similar need, the Livonians would be allowed to buy just as much grain "in open market" in Pskov. In agreement with these conditions, Kowerin sent as many carters as was necessary to carry the purchased grain accompanied by two chief commissaries boyar Michael Toresein and *Gost* Iwan Saizoff and two other men described as *Gollowannicki*. The purchase was carried out in the prescribed manner with "free passage" on the border.

Nyenstede then continued by recounting a different case which had taken place in the same year. A man by the name of Hanß Fehringk was caught for illegal trade with Muscovites.²⁷ Fehringk secretly delivered Muscovites some grain

26 The meaning of *Theuerung* (meaning dearth) in contemporary sources is not clear. In general it relates to abrupt decline in purchasing power, a situation in which the primary products have reached the price levels that they are no longer affordable. More about the concept of *theuerung* and its nuances, see for example: Ulrich-Christian Pallach (1986). *Hunger. Quellen zu einem Alltagsproblem in Europa und der Dritten Welt 17. bis 20. Jahrhundert*. München: Deutscher Taschenbuch-Verlag.

27 This case is repeated in: Nyenstedt 1839, 6.

and “other ammunition” (*andere Munition*) without having received a pass (*ohne Jehnigen Paß*) or permission from the Livonian authorities. The perpetrator was banished and banned from entering the Holy Roman Empire under the pain of death.

In conclusion, Nyenstede shared some thoughts with his esteemed colleague. As if to remind the Rigans of their moral obligation to follow in the footsteps of their forebearers, Nyenstede says that “the Livonians used to fight hard for their freedoms”.²⁸ Freedoms and privileges were not rock solid, and privilege holders had to be vigilant at all times. Therefore, Nyenstede advised them to consider means by which the 1614 grain dispatch could be prevented, otherwise the Livonian cities “will be deprived of all their income” (*alle Ihre Nahrung entzogen werden*). This final comment is of great importance, since it means that the 1614 grain deal preconditioned that foreigners (Muscovites/Pskovians?) would buy grain freely in Polish Livonia. The deal was drafted in the period of normalisation of relations with Muscovy. A short-term truce was concluded between Polish Livonia and Pskov, and from 1614, merchants of Pskov “holding a special letter” were allowed to visit Riga.²⁹ Nevertheless, the planned dispatch was a major breach of Livonian privileges. For Livonians preventing foreigners from direct access to goods in Riga’s economic hinterland, was a question of well-being, because it was largely built on Riga’s control over the vast hinterland and crops.³⁰ In Nyenstede’s opinion, Livonians should uphold to their policy amidst all the dangers and challenges. It follows that the 1614 grain dispatch ought to be arranged along the same or similar lines as the 1554 grain deal.³¹

Thomas Esper questioned the military aspect of Livonian sanction policy prior and during the Livonian war. Despite multiple accusations from

28 LNA-LVVA, 673–1–1321, fol. 106v.

29 Kotilaine 1999, 132–133.

30 The well-being of the citizens rested on the *Gästehandelsverbote*. Western merchants were not allowed to sail up the River Daugava or to establish direct trade contacts with foreigners (particularly, Muscovite merchants). Georg Jensch (1930). *Der Handel Rigas im 17. Jahrhundert: ein Beitrag zur livländischen Wirtschaftsgeschichte in schwedischer Zeit*. Riga: Kymmels Buchhandlung in Kommission, S. 58–59, 60–61, 67, 73–74.

31 The 1554 decision was drafted under completely different circumstances, along the lines of the peace treaty, which was negotiated with Muscovy that same year. Moscow demanded free passage and trade rights (including “war supplies”) in Livonia, which would practically prioritise them above any other merchant group in Livonia and undermine the Livonian policy of Muscovite exclusion from Western trade. Livonians made a settlement with Pskov out of fear of provoking the Muscovites, because Pskov was the subject of Muscovy.

the Livonian part, Western merchants were rarely caught delivering prohibited items, transporting Eastern goods was much more lucrative, besides the Livonians were aware that the Muscovites had already developed their own weapon industry. Prohibitions of “war supplies” could be used merely as a rhetoric device to fight unwelcome competition in “Russian” trade.³² While the circumstances and decisions of 1614 grain dispatch remain unclear, Nyenstede’s *articulum* show that Livonian sanction policy was addressing multiple issues at a time. For decades, free trade with the Muscovy had been non-existent. The economical perspective from the trade of grain with Muscovy was less relevant for Livonians than the risks it involved. As the case study shows, Livonian sanction policy was manoeuvring between the fear of escalating the long-standing antagonism with Muscovy, the risk of losing the position as middlemen in the ‘Russian trade’ and securing victuals for the nourishment of the local society. Nyenstede’s arguments implied that trade with enemy was permissible provided that it was arranged on Livonian terms. Nyenstede’s fear of the city’s losing its face was not because it would be servicing the enemy, but rather because it would set a bad precedent of historical proportions.

Appendix 1. LNA-LVVA, 673–1–1321, fol. 105v–106v

The title of the manuscript is missing, signature on the final page: “In Neustets *articul[um]* *Sub exitum A[nno]* 1614 In Stadt geschriffen” gives reference to its author “Neustets” – Frantz Nyenstede, period of production – “1614” and place of origin – “Stadt” or Riga city. Additionally, the year of production “A° 1614” is noted with a pencil on the upper left side of the front page. The text is written on folded paper, 16 pages long (fol. 104r–111v) with additional page for signature (fol. 112r). Similarly to the whole text, the transcribed paragraph is produced in the Middle Low German, occasionally using contraction and italics for Latin origin words and names of importance. In this edition, the given page numbering, original lining, and grammatical style is preserved to full extent. Ligatures are expanded in brackets. The comparative handwriting analysis is not conducted, therefore, the handwriting cannot be ascribed to Nyenstede with certainty.

Fol. 105v

So ist auch hie bei diesem Landtage, | notwendigk Zu gedenken, wie izt ohne |
alleschew alles Korn auß dem Lande | eigen Nuzes halben dem feinde Zuge |

³² Esper 1967, 193–196.

föhrett, vnd das Landt an allen vorrath | entblößett vnd in großertnewrung ge |
 setzett werde welches *directé* wieder die | Ubralte *recéssen* vnd *Vnion* der Landt |
 Stände, auch den Städten Lande vnd | Leütten zu eußersten schaden verderb |
 gereichen thutt, das derwegen demselbi | gen möchte ein wandell gefunden wer |
 denn. Dan dieß ist ein mahll wahr | das der mußcowiter auß diesem Lande |
 ohne Zulaß der Liefflendischen obrigkeit | Keinerley Korn Hatt Kauffen od[er]
 führen | muegen, wie mihr desselbigen ein wahr | hafftigk *Exempell* noch woll
 eingedenck | ist, Insonderheitt das A[nn]o 1554. der Stadt | Halter von der
 PleßKow *Bogdan Kowerin* | an den weilandt Hochwürdigen dahmah | ligen
 H[err] Bishoff zu Dörp[er]t Hermannum | Hatt schicken vnd bitten lassen, weilen |
 theürung in ihrem Lande wehre, das | ihnen muechte vorgünett werden, auß |
 Liefflandt 200 Last Korn für ihr bahr-

Fol. 106r

Geldt Zu Käuffen, welches ihnen Zugelassen | worden, dochmit dieser weranlas-
 sung vnd | *condition*, daß sie solche 200 Last Korn nicht | ihres gefallens binnen
 Landes besondern | auß der Stadt Dörp[er]te von den Bürgern vff | Käuffen solten,
 vnd das man wiederumb | in solchen fellen wen sie es Künfftigk nö | dich hetten
 machthaben solte zur PleßKow | vff offnen markte so viel Korn zu | Keuffen vnd
 nach Liefflandt zu führen, | wie vnd wan man begehren wehre, | Auff solche gege-
 bene *Caution* vnd vorsiche | rung seindt vom damahligen PlesKowische | Stadt
 Halter *Bogdan Kowerin* geschickett | worden Zweek Höbt *Comissarien* alß *Boia* |
rin Michael Toresein vnd *Gost Iwan Saizoff* | nebenst Zwei andere *Gollowannicki*
 mit | so viel Pleßkawschen fuhrleütten alß dar | zu nötigk gewesen, die solch Korn
 binnen | Dörp[er]te von den Bürgern fürbahr geldt | geKaufft vnd miteinem freyen
 Paß auß | Liefflandt nach der Pleßkaw geföhrett | haben; Vnd hatt sich insel-
 bigen | Jhar einer mit Nahmen Hans Fehringk | heimlicher wise vnderstanden
 seines | geitzes halber, etzliche Korn vnd andere | Munition ohne Jehnigen Paß
 oder Zulaß | der obrigKeitt auß Liefflandt dem Moßco | wieter ZuZuführen,
 welches offenbahr | worden, dadurch er ist *excludirt* vnd verban- |

Fol. 106v

nett worden auß dem gantzen Römischen | Reich biß an seinen Todt, so strenge
 ist da | mals vber die Freiheit des Landes ge | Halten worden; Der Halben ist
 nötigk | vff mittell Zu gedenken, wie diesem | vn[rath] möchte gewehrett werden
 den | den Städten Hierdurch alle Jhre Nahrung | entzogen werdenn.

SANKCIJAS PRET IENAIDNIEKU.
 GADĪJUMA STUDIJA PAR PLĀNOTO GRAUDU
 IZVEŠANU UZ MOSKOVIJU 1614. GADĀ.
 FRANCA NĪENSTEDES *ARTICULUM* EDICIJA

Viktors Dāboliņš

Kopsavilkums

Ekonomiskās sankcijas pret Krievijas Federāciju pēc pilna mēroga iebrukuma Ukrainā 2022. gada 24. februārī iezīmēja nopietnu Eiropas kolektīvās drošības problēmu: Ukrainas sabiedroto atšķirīgā izpratne par stratēģisko resursu tirdzniecību ar agresorvalsti radīja labvēlīgus nosacījumus tam, ka piemērojamās sankcijas netika konsekvēnti ievērotas un gaidītā efektivitāte netika panākta. Vēsturisks atskats rāda, ka ekonomiskās sankcijas kā ienaidnieka bruņošanās un kaujas spējas ierobežojošs instruments, piemēram, Livonijas vēsturē ir izmantots jau viduslaikos. 16. gadsimta sākumā, kas iezīmējās ar Maskavas kņazistes ekspansiju un pieaugošo antagonismu attiecībās ar Livoniju, sankciju politika tika pielietota arvien biežāk. Pret moskovītiem 16. gadsimta otrajā pusē Polijas pārvaldītajā Livonijā jeb Pārdaugavas hercogistē tika ieviests daļējs tirgošanās un pārvietošanās aizliegums, kura mērķis bija nepieļaut kritiski svarīgo Rietumu tehnoloģiju, speciālistu un resursu nonākšanu Maskavā. Savukārt poļu un moskovītu kara laikā 16. gadsimta otrajā pusē pret to tika realizēts pilnīgs embargo, ko mazināja tikai 1614. gadā.

Vēstures avotos un literatūrā sankciju politikas panākumi tiek apšaubīti. Neskatoties uz attiecīgu pētījumu trūkumu Latvijas historiogrāfijā, tomēr pieļaujams, ka livonieši vislielākos panākumus guva ar sankcijām graudu eksportā. Maskavas lielkņaziste bija ne tikai Rietumu industriālo preču importētājvalsts, bet periodiski atkarīga arī no graudu piegādēm no Livonijas. Vēstures avota publikācijā ir analizēts viens paragrāfs no Rīgas rātskunga Franca Nienstedes (1540–1622) 1614. gadā rakstītās instrukcijas (*articulum*), kurā viņš apsver to, kā, “nezaudējot seju”, izvest no Livonijas uz Moskoviju sankciju ierobežojumiem pakļauto stratēģisko precī – graudus.

Divas lapaspuses garajā 5. paragrāfā Nienstede uzskaita trīs galvenos argumentus pret graudu eksporta līguma nosacījumiem: vienošanās, kas slēgta ar Moskoviju, pildīšana par graudu izvešanu iztukšotu Livonijas krājumus, veicinātu inflāciju, kā arī būtu pretrunā ar seniem likumiem un Livonijas kārtu vienošanos šajā jautājumā. Plašāku argumentāciju Nienstede izvērs tikai pēdējā punktā, proti, ka moskovītiem nav atļauts izvest graudus no Livonijas bez kārtu sanāksmes piekrišanas. Šo tēzi viņš ilustrē ar diviem piemēriem no 1554. gada. Vienā gadījumā Tērbatas bīskaps Hermans II Vēzels (1552–1558) deva Pleskavas tirgotājiem atļauju izvest 200 lastus graudu, taču graudi bija jāiegādājas no Tērbatas pilsoņiem par skaidru naudu. Otrā gadījumā Nienstede atskatās uz tajā pašā gadā fiksētu kontrabandas mēģinājumu izvest uz Moskoviju graudus un munīciju.

Lai gan Nīenstede oponē plānotajai iecerei par graudu izvešanu uz ienaidnieka zemi, minētie piemēri liecina, ka viņš nav pret tirgošanos ar ienaidnieku, bet iebilst pret veidu, kas, viņaprāt, grauj Livonijas labklājības pamatus. No viņa komentāriem var spriest, ka 1614. gada graudu importu plānoja īstenot, moskovītu tirgotājiem ļaujot brīvu pieeju iekšzemes tirgum. Nīenstede netieši norāda, ka grūtos laikos tiek pārbaudīta vienotība un likumu spēks, uz kuriem balstās Livonijas sabiedrības labklājība, tāpēc nevajadzētu būt piekāpīgiem, kā tas esot bijis 1554. gadā.

Par citviet nedokumentēto graudu piegādi zināms, ka abpusējā vienošanās par graudu pārdošanu moskovītiem bija noslēgta attiecību normalizācijas gaisotnē. Poļu-moskovītu kara gados (1608–1614) kā Žečpospolīta, tā arī Livonija bija sarāvusi saimnieciskās saites ar naidīgajiem moskovītiem, taču 1614. gadā starp Livoniju un Pleskavu tika parakstīts īslaicīgs pamiers un atjaunoti tirdznieciskie kontakti.

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