THE VISION OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN THE USSR AS PLANNED BY RUSSIAN MILITARY ÉMIGRÉS AT THE END OF 1920S: THE BALTIC CONTEXT

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As the result of the Civil War in Russia, extensive numbers of émigrés fled abroad. One of the largest groups of the refugees consisted of the soldiers of anti-Bolshevik forces, who were eager to continue the struggle against the Soviet regime. To prevent dissolution of the army and for the sake of future mobilization, a significant part of Russian military émigrés were consolidated into the Russian All-Military Union (Russkij Obshevoinskij Soyuz, ROVS), which had branches also in the Baltic states. At the end of the decade, the key figures of ROVS developed a detailed plan of intervention through the so-called “limitrophe” states, including the Baltic countries. The plan itself was recently discovered in the Bakhmeteff Archive (New York). Description of this plan in conjunction with the recent researches upon the thesis, followed by the corresponding analytical work, could raise certain interest in the context of the interwar history in the Baltics.

Key words: military history, Baltic studies, history of Russian emigration, ROVS, Russian Army in exile.
irreconcilable attitude towards the Bolshevism, which manifested itself in rather different ways, from preserving and developing Russian culture abroad as an alternative to Soviet Russia, to the arrangement of terroristic attacks and military intervention. In order to prevent the dissolution, and for the sake of consolidation of Russian military émigrés, as well as to implement the plans of further struggle, in 1924 the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS) was established. It united all the largest Russian military organizations in exile and, in fact, represented an army without a state. As the ROVS interventional strategy was based on the support of their former allies – the Entente, which international policy was far from starting a military conflict with the USSR. However, in 1927 relationship between the USSR and several Western European countries significantly deteriorated. This situation was perceived by the Soviet side as a visible threat of a military conflict, while the ROVS saw it as the right moment to start acting. The plans of an intervention, which were composed by ROVS generals, are reflected in recently discovered documents at Bakhmeteff Archive of Russian and East European History and Culture at Columbia University in New York. According to these documents, certain offensive directions were planned to pass through the Baltic countries – Estonia and Latvia.

Despite the fact that the history of Russian emigration in its cultural, social and political hypostasis is quite well reflected in monographs (Rayev 1992; Huntington 1938) and compilations (Stanford Slavic Studies), while the history of Russian military emigration is revealed in the collections of documents (Basik 1998–2017; Kiselev 1999), lexicons (Okorokov 2003) and monographs (Robinson 2002; Schlögel 1995; Shkarenkov 1986; Tsurganov 2001; Goldin 2007; Semenov 2019; Goncharenko 2012) the problematic has been researched only in general terms. Moreover, the activities of the ROVS in the Baltic states have almost entirely escaped any scientific attention, thus, the role of the region in the plans of ROVS definitely merits research. The aim of the article is to reflect the role of Estonia and Latvia in the military planning of ROVS intervention in the USSR in the late 1920s. The article is based on recently discovered ROVS documents.

CIVIL WAR IN RUSSIA

Having started simultaneously with the coup d’état in the November of 1917, the Civil War in Russia spread across the huge territory of the former
Russian empire and involved a large variety of nations. In comparison with the similar conflicts in other countries, the Civil War in Russia had its own peculiarities, such as an unprecedented number of participants – 10–16 million in total. The lives and destinies of those people were affected by the war (Jēkabsons 2021, 37). Besides, the opposing sides manifested extreme violence towards their opponents. The systematically implemented Red Terror, which was based on the “class struggle” policy, in conjunction with the aforementioned peculiarities, became the main reason of the extensive waves of emigration. The apogee of Russian emigration took place in the November of 1920, when more than 146 thousand people, led by the Commander-in-Chief of Russian Army, Lieutenant General Pyotr Wrangel, left Crimea and fled abroad (Goldin 2007, 5).

THE PHENOMENON OF “RUSSIA ABROAD”

Despite the success of the Red Army and the establishment of the Soviet authority on the conquered territories, the Civil War in Russia continued until 1923, but some researchers claimed that the Civil War continued in Central Asia until the second half of the 1920s, or even until the beginning of the 1930s, though in different forms. It caused other streams of Russian emigration, which continued throughout the 1920s and declined only at the end of the decade, due to the “iron curtain” policy of the Soviet government. The total emigration reached the amount of at least 1.5 million refugees, who had settled in more than 40 countries (Robinson 2002, 15; Rayev 1992, 38). The emigration had its own peculiarities, such as the large number of highly educated persons and a much greater number of people, who had obtained secondary and primary education. The total number was significantly higher than in Russian Empire and in Soviet Russia (after 30.12.1922 – the USSR). During the following decade, a number of educational courses, schools and even universities, as well as a wide range of libraries, archives and institutes, had been established. Due to their high intellectual potential, the émigrés were able to create an alternative Russia, “Russia Abroad” (at least in its cultural hypostasis). It was achieved by preserving Russian national identity, traditions, spirit, culture, literature, history and other components, which were drastically changed, falsified or eliminated by the Bolsheviks back in Russia itself. “Russia Abroad” became a global cultural phenomenon, which spread almost in all countries, where
Russian émigrés had settled. Despite the wide variety of manifestations, “Russia Abroad” had its own, anti-Bolshevik mission – to preserve and to develop Russian culture abroad, in order to transfer it back to the motherland in the future, after the fall of Bolshevik dictatorship (Huntington 1933, 198–224).

RUSSIAN MILITARY EMIGRATION, RUSSIAN ALL-MILITARY UNION

At the same time, one of the main groups of Russian exile – soldiers and officers of the former anti-Bolshevik forces were the adepts of resistance against the Bolshevism in the form of military invasion or terror. After the evacuation from Crimea, this segment was significantly extended by the soldiers and officers of Russian Army. In comparison to other groups of military émigrés who went abroad as the result of defeats of other anti-Bolshevik forces, Russian Army under the command of P. Wrangel did not dissolve, retained its order, discipline and even weapons as a military potential of the “spring raid”, which was expected to take place in the beginning of 1921 (Robinson 2002, 31–34). Throughout the following years, the expectations of the intervention had gradually become illusory, however, due to political and economic circumstances the vast majority of soldiers upheld their irreconcilable attitude towards the Bolshevism and had been establishing military organizations in order to preserve the unity, ideological consolidation and implementation of their plans in the future.\(^1\)

Besides a number of issues, such as financial matters, dispersing of former soldiers, as well as the recognition of the USSR by former allies in 1924, another problem occurred. In the August of 1924, Grand Duke Cyril Vladimirovich proclaimed himself as the imperator of Russia. It led to a dissent in Russian emigration, where the vast majority supported another candidate, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (the former Commander-in-Chief of Russian Imperial Army), who was rather popular especially amongst Russian military émigrés. In his turn, the leader of Russian military émigrés P. Wrangel realized that the only way to consolidate,

\(^1\) Wrangel to A. S. Lukomsky, 12.08.1925., BAR, ROVS, Box 4, ROVS correspondence 1925, Central Office, general files (I).
prevent from the further dissent, as well as to preserve the forces for the sake of intervention or other anti-Bolshevik activities, was to create the central organization, which could unite all the military organizations in exile (Semyonov 2019, 49).

Thus, on 1 September 1924 the Russian All-Military Union (Russkij Obshevoinskij Soyuz, ROVS) was founded. In fact, the ROVS was a dispersed regular army that carried over the collapsed Russian statehood. This army could be mobilized on the certain signal into combat units again, in order to liberate Russia from the Bolsheviks (Robinson, op. cit., 112; Shkarenkov 1986, 36). The union was led by General P. Wrangel under the supervision of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, and in 1925 it consisted of more than 35 thousand soldiers. During the following years, the number of its members declined by almost 50% (Robinson 2002, 99–125).

The headquarters of the ROVS were located in Paris. The ROVS was administratively divided into five departments according to geographical principle. The Baltic states belonged to the 3rd department, and starting from 1930 – to the 2nd department (Tsurganov 2001, 12; Semyonov 2019, 145, 147). The headquarters of the department were located in Berlin and it was led by Lieutenant General Alexei von Lampe. As a matter of fact, the ROVS consisted of many autonomous organizations of military émigrés in different countries (Semyonov 2019, 49).

Despite its declared aims, the ROVS faced difficulties in many spheres of operation. Besides financial and administrative issues, it was constantly shaken by various disagreements, quarrels and scandals. Against all odds, the ROVS tried to continue its anti-Bolshevik mission, including activities in the USSR. Among its outputs were terroristic operations organized by General of Infantry Alexander Kutepov, one of the leaders of the ROVS. The Soviet secret services took security threats by the ROVS seriously, and invested considerable efforts in order to oppose it, especially in the form of special operations (Shkarenkov 1986, 145, 148–150). The huge, well organized and lavishly financed Soviet security and secret police structure (Objedinennoe gosudarstvennoe politicheskoe upravlenie, OGPU) had a large variety of opportunities to block ROVS activities. In many cases, it paralyzed activities of the Union, discredited its leaders, and created distrust among the émigrés (Pryanishnikov 1979, 52–91). Despite that, the ROVS retained the course of irreconcilability and the idea of struggle against the Bolshevism, which became highly topical at the end of 1920s.
THE END OF 1920S – THE LONG-AWAITED OPPORTUNITY FOR THE ROVS

The last three years of 1920s was the period of extremely tough challenges confronting the USSR. In 1927, the Soviet diplomacy faced the collapse in China, later an espionage scandal occurred in Great Britain, which resulted in severing the diplomatic ties between the two countries. In the summer of the same year, Soviet diplomatic representative in Poland Pyotr Voykov was killed by a Russian émigré, and a number of terroristic acts, implemented by ROVS combatants were conducted in Moscow, Leningrad and Minsk, while several other groups were arrested on the border. At the end of the year, the New Economic Policy (Novaya ekonomicheskaya politika, NEP) was dissolved, and the new course of “5-Year Plans” commenced. It was manifested in the Collectivization and the state’s total control over peasantry, while the supreme power was seized by Joseph Stalin after a protracted inner-party struggle (Zubov 2016, 43–45, 137). The implemented measures of repressions, expropriations and collectivization during the following years caused an enormous resistance of the peasantry. For example, only in 1930 more than 13 thousand uprisings took place in the USSR (Graciozi 2010, 46–54). Certain uprisings were led by former officers and participants of peasant movement, who fought against the Red Army during the Civil War, and thus an intervention, conducted by experienced former officers of anti-Bolshevik forces, in conjunction with the rebellions, could present significant threats for the Soviet authority. Russian military émigrés carefully followed the situation, which became much more suitable for the implementation of their plans at the end of 1920s, at least as perceived by the ROVS (Pryanishnikov 1979, 135).

The international tensions between the USSR and Western Europe raised hopes, if not for the outbreak of a military conflict, then at least for the support of the anti-Soviet activities of the émigrés by the foreign countries (Shkarenkov 1986, 153; Goncharenko, op. cit., 193). In the March of 1927, the assistant of chief of the ROVS Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, Prince Nikolai Obolensky and Lieutenant General Alexei Lukomsky approached the headquarters of the ROVS with a proposal to develop the plan of an intervention into the USSR with the aim to overthrow Soviet power there. The intervention should have been conducted in two significant directions – against Leningrad and Soviet Far East. To achieve this aim, the ROVS should have conducted an inner mobilization
and assemble its forces in the so-called “limitrophe” states near the Soviet border, where the Baltic states also played certain roles.²

RUSSIAN ANTI-BOLSHEVIK MOVEMENT IN LATVIA AND ESTONIA

Due to their geographical context and historical ties with Russia, Latvia and Estonia were the countries of the cultural area of “Russia Abroad”, however, in relation to the anti-Bolshevik movement, the Baltic states had their own political peculiarities, which rather differed from the situation in Western Europe. In accordance with the peace treaties with Soviet Russia, any anti-Bolshevik organizations and their activities were forbidden and branded as organizations hostile towards the USSR. Therefore, the ROVS and other anti-Bolshevik organizations acted illegally, or under the disguise of legal organizations. During the interwar period, the most important anti-Bolshevik organizations in Estonia and Latvia were the Union of Faithful (Soyuz Vernikh), the National Union for Protection of Motherland and Freedom (Narodniy sojuz zashity rodiny i svobody), the Brotherhood of Russian Truth (Bratstvo Russkoj Pravdy), the National Labour Union of the New Generation (Nacional’no-Trudovoj Sojuz Novogo Pokolenija) and the ROVS (Gusachenko 2020, 958–959). Due to the aforementioned restrictions, in Latvia these organizations acted under the cover of a legal Former Russian Military Mutual Aid Organization (Obshestvo vzaimopomoshli byvshih russkih voennozashitnih v Latvii) and some of them were led by Prince Anatol Lieven – a well-known figure of Russian Civil War in the North-Western region of the country, a significant personality in the context of military émigrés of “Russia Abroad”, also a writer and publisher.³

Despite the dissent in Russian emigration, it generally did not affect the community of Russian émigrés in Latvia. The local supporters of Great Duke Cyril Vladimirovich were nominally led by brothers Fyodor and Alexander Fehner, who were directly linked with the headquarters in Coburg (Germany).⁴

² From a letter from Prince N. Obolensky to A. S. Lukomsky, 29.03.1927. (Kiselev 1999, 36).
³ Latvian State Historical Archive (Latvijas Valsts vēstures arhīvs, LVVA). Information provided by the agents of Latvian Political Police 28.02.1928. LVVA, 3235–1/22–369, 304. lp.
⁴ Activities of Fehner brothers in Latvia. LVVA, 3235–1/22–687/1, 12. lp.
“Kirilovtsy” were quite active in the middle of 1920s. They were arranging transfer of illegal literature into the USSR, border crossings and collection of necessary strategic information for the needs of anti-Bolshevik struggle. The supporters of Great Duke Nikolai were led by Prince A. Lieven; some of them were members of the ROVS and the Brotherhood of Russian Truth (Bratstvo Russkoy Pravdi), and the League of Ober (Lyga Obera), which were also managed by A. Lieven (Bazanov 2013, 146–160). In some cases, “Kirillovcy” and “Nikolayevcy” cooperated in anti-Bolshevik activities, for instance, in 1927, when an illegal armed group from Latvia crossed the Soviet border and was captured by the OGPU. At least two participants of this event – Alfred Aderkass and Vasily Samoylov were linked with the organization of the Fehner brothers, however, the leader of the group, Nikolay Stroyevoy was a member of the ROVS, while the entire border crossing activity was implemented as a ROVS task. Just like in Estonia, the activities of Russian anti-Bolsheviks in Latvia were well known to Latvian Political Police (Politiskās Policijas pārvalde) and other secret services which, in some cases, cooperated with illegal organizations (Gusačenko 2019, 168–170). In 1927, the Fehners were exiled from Latvia, and thus further activities of “Kirillovcy” significantly declined. In their turn, the activities of organizations, which were led by Colonel A. Lieven, had been taking place until the beginning of the 1930s, and afterwards were directed by other persons who were also linked with the ROVS (Bazanov 2013, 146–160). In some cases, activities of Russian anti-Bolsheviks in Latvia were linked with the branches of their organizations in Estonia.

The leaders of Russian émigrés in Estonia – Lieutenant General Alexei Baiov and Lieutenant General Oleg Vasilkovsky, formed their own reconnaissance and sabotage squads, which operated in close cooperation with the Estonian political police (PolPol), on the other side of the Soviet-Estonian border. Just like in Latvia, in Estonia the activities of the ROVS were illegal and prohibited. As the Soviet Union itself did not abide by the Tartu Peace Treaty and continued to favour the activities of Estonian communists in Russia, PolPol secretly cooperated with White émigrés (Rosenthal 2010, 302–304). At the same time, PolPol expressed its interest in the internal organization of the ROVS on a much wider scale than only in the territory of Estonia.\footnote{Baiov – N. N. Stogov, 18.07.1930., BAR, ROVS, Box 5, ROVS correspondence 1930, Central Office – I Otdel (I).}
According to the headquarters of the ROVS, Russian military émigrés in Estonia were poorly organized. Unlike those in Latvia, émigrés in Estonia did not have a competent and recognized leader. The activities of military émigrés in Estonia were paralyzed by a quarrel between two leaders, Baiov and Vasilkovsky. In any case, from the point of view of the headquarters of the ROVS, it was important for all of the associations of Russian military émigrés in Estonia to unite under the general leadership. As the conflict with O. Vasilkovsky intensified, a group of representatives of the ROVS headquarters was sent to him in 1926 or 1927 in order to persuade the general to submit to A. Baiov (Abisogomian 2008, 62, 66). This attempt to unite Russian military émigrés in Estonia was made by General of Cavalry Pavel Shatilov, the commander of ROVS 1st Department, and a former associate of O. Vasilkovsky from the times they had served in Russian Imperial Guard (Andreev 2018, 80). P. Shatilov issued an order to those former soldiers and officers of the North-Western Army, who in 1930 resided in Estonia. The aim of the order was to unite the necessary personnel, so that it would be available for the planned intervention. Based on P. Shatilov’s order, O. Vasilkovsky formed a new organization under his own leadership – the Union for Assistance to Members of the North-Western
Army and Russian Émigrés (Soyuz vzaimopomoshi chinov byvwej Severo-Zapadnoj armii i russkih emigrantov v Estonii). Although P. Shatilov and A. von Lampe were admitted as honorary members of the Union, O. Vasilkovsky’s organization had never been part of the ROVS.⁶

However, it can be assumed that ROVS leaders never had a full confidence in A. Baiov, either. His constant intrigues against O. Vasilkovsky did not pass unnoticed. A. Baiov was also remembered by many Russian officers first and foremost as a talentless lecturer from the times of

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⁶ It is interesting to note, that in 1934, a rather unexpected turn of events took place, when Major-General Nikolai Skoblin, one of the leaders of the ROVS and NKVD spy, visited Vasilkovsky’s organization in Narva. After Skoblin’s visit, Vasilkovsky took a pro-Soviet stance and started to demand that ROVS leaders would stop quarrelling and recognize the Soviet Union (Abisogomian 2007, 88, 90, 93). Vasilkovsky’s activities were generally condemned by the headquarters of the ROVS. Appeal of the Union for Assistance to Members of Northwestern Army and Russian Émigrés to the chairman of the ROVS General Yevgeny Miller, 27.01.1935., BAR, ROVS, Box 5, ROVS correspondence 1935, Central Office – I Otdel (7). Letter to the deputy chairman of the Union for Assistance to Members of Northwestern Army and Russian Émigrés, 18.02.1935., BAR, Box 63, ROVS correspondence 1935, II Otdel to Central Office.
the Nikolai General Staff Academy, but by no means as a capable military leader⁷ (Kopõtin 2019, 89). After A. Baiov’s death, Colonel Boris Engelhardt became the head of the Estonian branch of the ROVS. It is difficult to say, why the board did not have a full confidence in B. Engelhardt at that time. Perhaps this was due to the fact that B. Engelhardt simultaneously worked for several foreign intelligence services (Rosenthal 2010, 537).

Despite the inner issues in 1927, an increase in the activities of émigrés in Estonia were also noticed by the headquarters of the ROVS. Its representatives visited Estonia, where they met with the leaders of the local branches of the ROVS – A. Baiov and B. Engelhardt, and allegedly even the Minister of the Foreign Affairs. The reason of the visit was the idea to use the territory of Estonia as a tête de pont for the intervention into the Soviet Union (Abisogomian 2008, 71). This information, as well as other plans of the intervention, where the Baltic states played a certain role, were reflected in the documents of the ROVS that were recently discovered in the Bakhmeteff Archive.

WAR PLANNING BY THE ROVS IN THE LATE 1920S

In view of the developments described above, the intervention plan was submitted to the then leader of the ROVS, A. Kutepov, in the September of 1929, along with the supplement containing mobilization plan, which is of special interest.⁸ Conditionally, these documents can be marked as “A. Valuyev’s plan”, named after their author. Presumably, these documents had been composed by Lieutenant General Arcady Valuyev and directed to A. Kutepov in 1929. A. Valuyev was a former head of the military administration of Stavropol Government by the Lieutenant General Anton Denikin’s army, and after the Civil War resided in Yugoslavia.

P. Wrangel, who was infected (presumably by GPU) with tuberculosis, unexpectedly passed away in 1928, and A. Kutepov became the chairman of the ROVS. Before taking the office, A. Kutepov assessed the situation among the Russian military emigration and evaluated it as difficult. Due

⁷ A. A. von Lampe to P. A. Kusonsky, 17.06.1937., BAR, Box 63, ROVS correspondence 1937, II Otdel to Central Office.

⁸ Mobilization plan with the scheme of deployment, 21.09.1929., BAR, ROVS, Box 11, ROVS correspondence, V. to Kutepov A. P.
to the scarce resources, which denied any hope of achieving result, he
decided to step away from any active work. On the other hand, having
acknowledged the deep crisis in the ROVS, the general considered it neces-
sary to thoroughly reorganize it. Consequently, in 1928–1929 the new
chairman of the ROVS could consider a possibility of an alternative action
against the USSR, which could be the intervention, so desired by many
émigrés. In addition, as A. Valuyev wrote in his memo to A. Kutepov,
the time factor played a considerable role against the ROVS. According
to A. Valuyev’s documents, the intervention could no longer be delayed,
since the combat capability of the emigrants had steadily decreased over
the years. In any case, A. Valuyev’s documents reflected the dreams of
many military emigrants to perform a “spring raid” into the Soviet Union
(Tsurganov 2001, 27). Soon after the composition of A. Valuyev’s document,
which was drafted in January 1930, A. Kutepov was abducted from Paris
by the Soviet special services.

A. VALUYEV’S PLAN

The detailed plan consists of about 10 pages of idea descriptions and
graphic applications. According to the plan, the intent of military plan-
ners was to conduct the military intervention into the USSR with ROVS
military units being supported by foreign allies. Prior to the operation,
the white émigrés in Europe should have been mobilized into combat
units. Thus, the rally point must have been in the “limitrophe” states,
including the Baltic countries, bordering with the USSR. The moving of
ROVS combat units to the Soviet border had to begin in the spring of 1930,
and by the autumn of the same year (at the latest), the European part of
Russia had to be liberated from the communists.

A. Valuyev’s plan had to be conducted in two phases. During the first
phase, ROVS combat units had to cross the Soviet border in 9 different
points and advance into Soviet territory in order to seize Moscow – the capi-
tal city of the USSR, from different directions. Intervention by the ROVS

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9 Alexander Kutepov and Boris Shteifon’s correspondence, 1926–1929 (Gagkuev 2009,
460–469).

10 Valuyev’s Plan, mobilization plan with the scheme of deployment, 21.09.1929., BAR,
ROVS, Box 11, ROVS correspondence, V to Kutepov A. P.
should have caused a mass uprising of Soviet people. The insurgents were supposed to unite with the units of the ROVS and thus increase their capabilities. During the second phase of the operation, significantly increased anti-Bolshevik forces had to attack Moscow. A. Valuyev’s concept was named an “encirclement intervention” or a “hay-burning” strategy – by analogy with a stack of hay, the sides of which are set on fire. The fire quickly reaches the top. Tactically, its implementation was based on the theory and practice of guerrilla warfare in a sense of the rich military history of Russia. In terms of mobilization, all members of the ROVS (or the partisans), were obliged to join the “liberation troops”. Each member had to

11 Valuyev’s Plan, mobilization plan with the scheme of deployment, 21.09.1929., BAR, ROVS, Box 11, ROVS correspondence, V to Kutepov A. P., pp. 2, 8–9.
be provided with the necessary travel and military means. The members, who received a mobilization order, had to arrive at the primary assembly place within three days.\(^{12}\)

The mobilization was to be initiated by a command, which was formed at the basis of the headquarters of the ROVS. The specially created mobilization department had to inform the local ROVS departments by telegrams, and to provide guidance on issuing collective entry visas to the border states. In order to gather émigrés on the border of the Soviet Union, the assembly areas of ROVS departments were planned. According to that plan, the groups of émigrés had to move to their assembly areas,

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\(^{12}\) Valuyev’s Plan, mobilization plan with the scheme of deployment, 21.09.1929., BAR, ROVS, Box 11, ROVS correspondence, V to Kutepov A. P., pp. 3–4.
which were usually located in the capitals of certain countries. Afterwards, the partisans had to be transported to a bigger concentration point – usually to a large port, such as Danzig (nowadays – Gdansk), and from there had to be further transferred to the Baltics, closer to the Soviet border.

Upon arrival in the countries, which had a common border with the USSR, the final formation of the units (or the offensive columns) had to take place in accordance with the members’ previous affiliation with the regimental organizations. Before the operation, the partisans were required to pray to God and receive the Holy Communion according to the old Russian military traditions.

Each unit was to receive a guide for crossing the border, an ideological guidance (how to deal with communists, locals, non-Russians, or the so-called inorodtsy (non-Russians), political slogans, etc.), a short tactical textbook, based on “The Science of Victory”, which was composed by Generalissimo Alexander Suvorov in 1795, and a brief summary of the reasons for the failure of the White Movement before 1920. Despite all that, any political activities were prohibited in accordance with the general principle of the ROVS. This principle had been referred to as the political inconsistency (political indecision about the future of Russia), that had always been emphasized at the headquarters of the ROVS. In case of the planned military intervention by the ROVS against the Soviet Union, that meant the absence of a political program and thus an inescapable failure of the planned operation. It seems that after 10 years of fighting against the Bolsheviks, Russian émigrés had not learned the lessons and did not understand the nature of the Civil War. Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich expressed the ROVS goals as the following: “We must liberate Russia, then give salute and step aside”. Over the years, the lack of a political program had also created different misunderstandings among the members of this organization.

It seems that A. Valuyev’s assessment of the enemy was not realistic or was based on the faulty information. For example, he considered the OGPU

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13 Valuyev’s Plan, mobilization plan with the scheme of deployment, 21.09.1929., BAR, ROVS, Box 11, ROVS correspondence, V to Kutepov A. P., p. 9.
15 Captain of the 1st rank Podgorny to Shatilov, 04.10.1933., BAR, ROVS, Box 5, ROVS correspondence 1933, Central Office – I Otdel (5).
and foreign units like Red Latvians or Chinese to be the main threats to the White partisans in Russia. Most likely, he was not aware of the actual situation and the structure of the contemporary Red Army. Its forces, which consisted of mobilized peasants, were not considered as dangerous, probably due to the assumption that their fighting morale may have been low due to the Collectivization, which had begun in the Soviet Union. By analogy with P. Wrangel’s army practice, the units could be replenished with the surrendered Red Army soldiers (Gagkuev 2012, 532–538).

The lack of supply facilities and medical evacuation for the anti-Bolshevik partisans were seen as a major challenge by the author of the document. A. Valuyev, just like many other leaders of the ROVS, considered foreign support of the intervention as of highest importance. With the help of the allies, he was hoping to strengthen the rear of the ROVS, as well as to assault landings in the Baltic and Black Seas, and to establish supply bases in the bordering countries. At the same time, a certain concept existed in the ROVS and was also shared by A. Valuyev, that the leading role in the liberation of Russia had to be performed by Russian émigrés themselves, and not by foreign countries. In any case, the émigrés had to persuade foreign authorities and governments that the USSR would not stop its destructive propaganda and influence in Europe, and that Russia had to rebuild its national state in order to pay off Russia’s old debts.

ROVS ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH ESTONIA AND LATVIA

Despite the importance of the territory of Estonia and Latvia, the main role for conducting A. Valuyev’s plan in the Baltics should have been assigned to the ROVS units, which were formed in Western and Central Europe. The ROVS assault columns in Estonia should have been manned by the members of old Russian guard regiments, and in Latvia – by the members of old Russian cavalry regiments. Assembly points for White partisans from Europe were designated in Narva and Rēzekne, near the Soviet border. A. Valuyev’s plan had not envisaged any assembly points in Lithuania, because of the lack of common border with Soviet Union. It is not clear, why the Narva and Rēzekne columns had to consist of the former guardsmen or cavalrymen, respectively, and whether it was related to the proximity of St. Petersburg. At least 36 former guardsmen resided in Estonia and were
concentrated in regimental organizations. This made up only about 4% of all local military émigrés.\textsuperscript{16} Concerning Latvia, the active members of anti-Bolshevik organizations were mainly the former officers and soldiers, or young men, who had never served in cavalry or the guard, or even in the army. Therefore, we can assume, that the main force in these assault columns was to be formed from the former guardsmen and cavalrymen, who resided in other European countries, outside the Baltics. Probably it was possible for the local ROVS members to join a squad as ordinary members or specialists. In any case, it can be inferred that A. Valuyev did not envisage the leading role for the local leaders or representatives in his intervention plan.

**CONCLUSIONS**

A. Valuyev’s plan reflected the hopes of many Russian military émigrés to achieve revenge in the Civil War. Moreover, the plan was partially implemented during the German invasion into the Soviet Union in 1941, in which some Russian émigrés also took part. In reality, at that time the émigrés were not able to influence political events or the course of the war campaign (Drobiazko 2004, 99, 196). However, Valuyev’s plan contained the ideas, that could later be partially used in some anti-Soviet military formations during the World War II (Zhukov & Kovtun 2012, 65–85; Drobiazko & Karashchuk 1998, 38). In the intervention planning, the Baltics were considered as the bordering region with the Soviet Union. At the same time, both sides treated the Baltics as a *tête de pont* for military actions against the USSR. It is commonly known that this fact was used as an argument in the Molotov – Selter negotiations against Estonia in the September of 1939.\textsuperscript{17} Due to the fact that the activities of Russian émigrés against the Soviet Union had always been the focus of attention of the Soviet special services, considerable resources were spent on opposing them, which also led to certain effects. In the view of this, it can be


\textsuperscript{17} Negotiations between V. Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR, and K. Selter, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia, in Moscow, 24.–25.09.1939. (Arumäe 1989, 126).
assumed that the Soviet special services were aware of A. Valuyev’s plan from the moment it was presented to A. Kutepov. At the same time, those White émigrés, who resided in Estonia and Latvia, were considered by the headquarters of the ROVS as a marginal force, due to their fragmentation and small number, and therefore they were planned to be used only as an adjunct to the White émigré organizations, which operated in Western, Central and Southern European countries. By the beginning of the World War II, the White émigrés lost their military capabilities, so that by the end of the 1930s there could be only a handful of émigrés in the border countries, who were able to take part in hostilities (Aleksandrov 2003, 14, 22–23).

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KRIEVU MILITĀRĀS EMIGRĀCIJAS BRUŅOTAS INTERVENCES VĪZIJAS PSRS 20. GS. 20. GADU NOGALĒ: BALTIJAS KONTEKSTS

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Kopsavilkums

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